Research

(Check back soon! I update this page whenever there are updates.)

Philosophy is fun. I enjoy doing philosophy both as a body of theories and as a human practice. I take first-person experience not merely as evidence for philosophical reflection, but as one of its indispensable sources. Given this interest, I explore how first-person experience shapes our understanding of normativity, artistic practice, human flourishing, and our relationship with an increasingly intelligent world. Ultimately, I am interested in how philosophy can help us better understand ourselves and transform lived experience into wisdom.

Zhou, Yili (2026). Why Follow the Score? Aesthetic Normativity in Performing Classical Music and the Genuine Performing Experience. British Journal of Aesthetics. htts://philpapers.org/rec/ZHOWFT

Zhou, YiLi & Borchert, Rhys (2023). The Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument. Philosophy 98 (2):215-241. https://philpapers.org/rec/ZHOTPO-7

Zhou, Y., Lim, D. and Xi, C, “Motivational Externalism and Misdescribing Cases,” American Journal of Bioethics – Neuroscience Vol.7. (2016): 218-219

A paper on how moral self-cultivation impacts one’s aesthetic life (received the British Society of Aesthetics’ 2026 New Horizons Prize and is currently under review)

In both Western and Chinese cultural traditions, philosophers perennially discuss how music is not separable from our moral lives. For instance, both Plato and Confucius argue that music influences our inner lives: great music can establish listeners’ psychic harmony and restore their virtuous states. However, rarely do Western philosophers ask whether having a virtuous mental state promotes one’s sensibility to music. In this paper, I explore how one’s musicianship might benefit from moral self-cultivation. I propose one possibility through a comparison between moral extension and emotional substitution in music performances.

A paper on aesthetic value and individuality (co-authored with Rhys Borchert)

The individualized nature of aesthetic appreciation is particularly salient when an artwork resonates with us. It’s a matter of the fact that aesthetic qualities impart themselves upon our soul; we appreciate the work of art not just because of the way it is, but because of the way we are. This kind of aesthetic experience, the resonance, indicates an intimate relationship between an artwork and an aesthetic agent, among other things, and justifies a (defeasible) judgment of aesthetic value. We think that focusing on this specific kind of aesthetic experience may help to provide a better way to understand the relationship between aesthetic value and individuality. Additionally, it may help to shed light on the nature of aesthetic knowledge more generally.

In this paper, we will introduce the phenomenon of resonance, point out the situations of misrecognition of resonance, and discuss how it contributes to our understanding of aesthetic value.

A paper on bodily movements in performing instrumental music (under review)

“If Liszt played behind a screen, a great deal of poetry would be lost,” remarked Schumann – a quote invoked by scholars who recognize the significant role of visual stimuli in perceiving music, a claim supported by numerous empirical studies in music psychology. However, the normative question of whether instrumental music performance should incorporate visual aspects, as theatrical performances do, has received little attention. This paper addresses this gap by proposing two objections to theatricalization from the perspective of the music performer: first, bodily movements and facial expressions convey the performer’s intentions, not the music itself; second, integrating such elements risks conflating musical and non-musical components of the music activity. My aim is not to provide decisive reasons in defense of Practical Orthodoxy – proritazing the sound produced by instruments – but rather to offer considerations for its opponents.

A paper on the “why be moral” question (under review)

We philosophers have long pondered the question, “Why be moral?” By asking this question, we seek to uncover the significance of morality not only for those who are indifferent to moral concerns, but perhaps even more importantly, for ordinary individuals like most of us who are drawn to morality but still wonder why it matters. For us, the “Why be moral” question is an exploration of the significance of being moral, rather than a challenge to its authority. This parallels how we sometimes contemplate the meaning of life, without it implying any consideration of suicide. I believe that the answer to the “Why be moral?” question for ordinary people like us is hidden in the following folk intuition: We perceive individuals with kind hearts as less morally problematic than those with bad hearts, regardless of whether they actually perform good deeds or not. Our intuition emphasizes the crucial role – a psychological-phenomenological feature – plays in the moral context: sincerely responding to one’s uneasy mind when witnessing others in need.

Can AI have a childlike heart-mind? AI art and imperfection as an aesthetic merit

Our interest in AI art—whether AI can generate genuine artworks or be an art agent—is spurred partly by the technology and partly by how it pushes us to think about our humanity. Similar questions arose when machines began making objects that once required human craft. Machine-made goods still involve people, so the problem is not whether agents are involved but what degree of agential power they exercise. Yet craftsmanship possesses a quality of by-hand-ness. By-hand-ness need not involve an actual flaw—a handmade object can be flawless—but it reveals the possibility of flaws: norm violation, incomplete control, an unfinished process. The more flawless and standardized a work appears, the less readily we perceive its human quality. In this sense, imperfection is one aesthetically good aspect of by-hand goods.

Can the same story apply in the AI era? First, I consider whether imperfection can be an intrinsic aesthetic merit—appreciated as imperfection, not merely tolerated or valued instrumentally. So I need to distinguish genuinely appreciated imperfection from both norm violation and tolerated error. Wabi-sabi and Li Zhi’s (李贽) childlike heart-mind, or tong xin (童心), offer resources here: on my reading, imperfection is constitutive of the childlike heart-mind rather than its unfortunate side effect. Second, can AI make valuable imperfect art? Among three kinds of imperfection—accidental errors, imperfections intentionally retained for an artistic purpose, and imperfections originating in the maker’s imperfect nature—I am interested only in the third, which reveals our mortality, finitude, and humanity. Can AI’s imperfection genuinely manifest these qualities rather than merely simulate them? Can AI have a childlike heart-mind that differs from a junzi’s (君子) and make wabi-sabi art?

Work in Progress Memo: Lintie (临帖) in Chinese Calligraphy and Score-Following in Classical Music Performance

My central question is: as a practice of imitating masters’ calligraphic works, how do calligraphic works from Lintie (临帖) genuinely express the calligrapher’s aspirations and tastes? On the face of it, Lintie is merely pedagogical. Of its two kinds—Shilin (实临, copying the work) and Yilin (意临, following the intention)—I focus on the second, which requires some departure from the master’s work while still requiring genuine imitation.

In the literature of authenticity in performing classical music, Stephen Davies distinguishes score-authenticity from interpretation-authenticity: the score fixes work-determined features, and the performer provides her own voice within the space they leave open, so fidelity and self-expression occupy different layers. Borrowing a lesson from Lintie, I propose instead that following the score is a way to encounter the composer. Performance requires expressing oneself through conversation with the composer—or with the fictional persona in the music—not through superficial features but through spirit and essence, as Dong Qichang (董其昌) suggests: 临帖如骤遇异人,不必相其耳目手足头面,当观其举止笑语精神流露处。